Identity and integration of Russian speakers in the Baltic states: a framework for analysis by Cheskin, Ammon
This is an author’s final draft. The article has been published by Ethnopolitics. (2015) 14:1, 
pp.72-93: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17449057.2014.933051#.U8EwofldWSo  
 
 
Identity and Integration of Russian Speakers 
in the Baltic States: A Framework for Analysis 
Dr Ammon Cheskin, Central and East European Studies, University of Glasgow 
Ammon.cheskin@glasgow.ac.uk  
 
Abstract: Following a review of current scholarship on identity and integration 
patterns of Russian speakers in the Baltic states, this article proposes an analytical 
framework to help understand current trends. Rogers Brubaker’s widely-employed 
triadic nexus is expanded to demonstrate why a form of Russian-speaking identity has 
been emerging, but has failed to become fully consolidated, and why significant 
integration has occurred structurally but not identificationally. By enumerating the 
subfields of political, economic, and cultural ‘stances’ and ‘representations’ the model 
helps to understand the complicated integration processes of minority groups that 
possess complex relationships with ‘external homelands’, ‘nationalizing states’ and 
‘international organizations’. Ultimately, it is argued that socio-economic factors 
largely reduce the capacity for a consolidated identity; political factors have a 
moderate tendency to reduce this capacity; while cultural factors generally increase 
the potential for a consolidated group identity. 
 
This article proceeds by reviewing the scholarly literature from 1992-2014 relating to 
Russians/Russian speakers in the Baltic states. The review is based on an analysis of various 
literatures that have focused directly on Russian speakers in the one of more of the Baltic 
states. The main questions addressed in this article are: to what extent has a ‘Russian-
speaking nationality’ emerged in the Baltic states?; what are the main factors that impede or 
facilitate the materialization of such an identity?; and how can we understand contemporary 
integration trends among Russian speakers? The articles reviewed include studies of 
identity, integration, socio-economics, education policy, language practice, and ethnic 
relations generally.  
The review is used in order to construct a coherent theoretical and analytical framework to 
understand current trends in the development of Russian-speaking identities in the Baltic 
states. Rogers Brubaker’s ‘triadic nexus’ is used as a starting point for this task. By 
elaborating upon Brubaker’s nexus, a more causal model is developed that can help policy-
makers and academics understand more fully contemporary identificational trends among 
Russian speakers in the Baltic states.  
The analysis of previous research is used to demonstrate the validity of distinguishing 
between cultural, political, and economic forms of attraction and repulsion. In so doing this 
paper argues that it is possible to conceptualize more fully the complex, ‘quadratic’ 
interactions between Russian speakers, the Baltic states, the European Union, and Russia. As 
the analysis shows, Russia generally has the potential for high cultural attraction but 
relatively low political and economic attraction for Russian speakers, while the Baltic states 
have low cultural attraction, relatively high economic attraction, and contradictory levels of 
political attraction. These factors mean that there are conflicting pressures on Russian 
speakers to consolidate their internal identity and to integrate into the social and political 
lives of the Baltic states. This expanded nexus also has direct relevance to the study of other 
minority groups that have potentially important relationships with ‘external homelands’ and 
‘nationalizing states’. 
Russian-speaking nationality? 
One of the most pressing questions that has concerned researchers of post-Soviet, Russian-
speaking identity in the Baltic states relates to the question of group identity. To what extent 
is it valid to recognize a well-defined community of Russian speakers?1 Should Russian 
speakers be treated as a national or ethnic minority or does the large diversity within this 
group make such categorizations problematic?  
In the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union scholars were unclear how to 
label the non-Estonian/Latvian/Lithuania populations of the Baltic states. The 
appropriateness of treating Russians or Russian-speakers as a singular group has been 
questioned, as any given label comes with its own misleading assumptions (Poppe & 
Hagendoorn 2001). This was evidenced by early studies that found it problematic to talk of a 
unified Russian/Russian-speaking community with common interests (Kirch 1992; Kirch, 
Kirch & Tuisk 1993; Aasland 1994; Melvin 1995).  
Numerous factors have been identified to explain the weakness of collective identity in this 
early, post-Soviet period. Graham Smith (1996, 208) notes that Russian speakers were 
divided by their rootedness (length of residence in the Baltic region), language practice, 
occupation, and nationality (national’nost’). Particular attention has been paid to the legacy 
of Soviet nationality policies as an explanatory factor for weak collective identities (Agarin 
2010; Brubaker 1994). Multilayered Soviet practices resulted in the absence of a strong 
sense of Russianness when the Soviet Union collapsed. For example, Russian and Soviet 
were terms that were often conflated. Many Russian speakers in the Baltic states initially 
considered themselves first and foremost Soviet citizens rather than Russians (Vihalemm & 
Masso 2003, 101). In 1990, for example, Linz and Stepan (1996, 411) found that only 4.2% of 
non-Latvians in Latvia stated that they felt primarily ‘of Russia’. In Estonia the corresponding 
figure was 12%. Indeed, the Soviet practice of rigidly demarcating and maintaining personal 
definitions of nationality (natsional’nost’) meant that many Russian speakers actually 
considered themselves to be Ukrainian, Belarusian etc. rather than Russian.  
The fragmented nature of these identities leads us to question the validity of studying 
Russian speakers as a meaningful group. However, in the post-Soviet era, a number of 
scholars have also pointed to the relative consolidation of Russian-speaking identity (distinct 
from Russian identity). David Laitin (1995) has gone furthest in identifying an emergent 
‘Russian-speaking nationality’ in the Baltic states. This identity is distinct from Russian 
identity and is consolidated around the ‘Balticization’ of Russian speakers (Melvin 1995). 
Supporting this view there is much evidence that Russian speakers in the Baltic states view 
themselves as fundamentally different from Russians in Russia (Zepa 2006; Vihalemm & 
Masso 2003; Cheskin 2013; Fein 2005).      
Additionally, there is evidence that a form of group consciousness has been evolving which 
centres around the linguistic categorization of ‘Russian-speakers’ (Tabuns 2010, 260-264; 
Cheskin 2010; Kronenfeld 2005, 272; Cheskin 2013, 293-294). This is clearly apparent in the 
media where the term Russian-speaker is increasingly used as a linguistic signifier to 
describe an otherwise fairly disparate group (Cheskin 2010; Khanov 2002, 14). It is in Latvia 
where this trend is most apparent, especially following the country’s 2003/4 education 
reforms that demanded Russian schools (schools whose language of instruction was Russian) 
move to conducting at least 60% of their instruction in Latvian. This led to mass protests as 
individuals increasingly defined themselves by their use of the Russian language (Hogan-
Brun 2006; Cheskin 2010).  
The literature therefore identifies two seemingly contradictory tendencies – on the one 
hand the disavowal of certain links with Russia, and fragmentated identities, and on the 
other hand a relative consolidation of linguistic identity, centring on the Russian language. 
While, on first inspection, this may appear to present somewhat of a conundrum, in fact it is 
potentially explained when we distinguish between cultural and political forms of 
identification. Russian-speaking identity in the Baltic states shows some signs of 
consolidating around cultural preferences, notably the Russian language. At the same time, 
political and territorial links with Russia seem to be weakening. These ideational 
developments have great significance not only for Russian-speaking identities but also for 
the integration strategies pursued by Russian speakers. For one thing this trend towards 
identification along linguistic lines (Cheskin 2012, 326-327; Cianetti 2014, 2) has meant that, 
in the Baltic states, Belarusians, Ukrainians, and other Soviet nationalities are potentially 
able to find a discursive place within a well-defined imagined community.2 Culturally at least, 
this opens up the possibility for Russia to exert a meaningful influence, not just over 
Russians, but also over a broader categorization of Russian speakers.  
Russian speakers and integration 
Many observers have examined the issue of Russian-speaking identities from the perspective 
of the integration dynamics inherent within the Baltic states. Such research has largely been 
informed by John Berry’s theoretical model of inter-cultural relations (Berry, 1997). Based on 
a cross-cultural psychology approach, Berry notes the importance of cultural interactions in 
determining human behaviour (6). He outlines four main acculturation models for 
individuals who are faced with cross-cultural contact: assimilation (giving up one culture and 
adopting another), integration (embracing both cultures), separation (maintaining one 
culture and avoiding contact with another), and marginalization (alienation from both 
cultures).  
The theme of integration has been most visible in Latvia and Estonia, where, citizenship was 
initially withheld from the majority of Russian speakers. This was grounded on the principle 
that the Baltic states had been illegally occupied by the Soviet Union. Soviet-era immigrants, 
therefore, did not constitute a legal part of the countries’ ‘core nations’ (Smith et al. 1998). 
Following international pressure, citizenship laws were finally introduced allowing Russian 
speakers to naturalize if they could meet certain requirements, including language 
knowledge and having a basic grasp of the country’s history (see Barrington 2000). 
Eduard Ponarin (2000, 1538) has noted that because of increasing numbers of Russian 
speakers who have thus been able to acquire citizenship, there is now a ‘race between 
intergenerational assimilation and increasing political power of the Russophone population.’ 
On the one hand there is pressure on non-titular3 groups to integrate, or assimilate, into 
Baltic societies, therefore diluting the strength of any Russian-speaking identity. On the 
other hand the increased political power that accompanies an increase in the size of a 
potentially ethnicized electorate could lead to the opposite effect and an increase in the 
political capital of a consolidated Russophone identity.  
An assessment of which of these competitors, ‘integration/assimilation’ or ‘political 
consolidation’, is currently leading the race is complicated. In 1998 David Laitin proposed a 
competitive assimilation argument, positing that Russian speakers would assimilate into 
Baltic societies both linguistically and culturally. He based this assessment on his ‘tipping’ 
model of identity formation. As soon as Russian-speaking individuals perceived the rational 
benefits (both economically and socially) of learning the state language as greater than 
maintaining monolingualism, they would learn the state language and assimilate (21-24).  
Notwithstanding the theoretical sophistication of Laitin’s reasoning, subsequent studies 
have shown that a majority of Russian speakers in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have a 
preference for integration over assimilation (Kemppainen et al. 2004; Kronenfeld 2005; 
Pisarenko 2006; Šūpule 2007; Kasatkina 2006). These studies show clear evidence that 
Russian speakers commonly have a desire to learn the culture and language associated with 
their state of residence, whilst simultaneously maintaining Russian cultural and linguistic 
identities. While it is apparent that Russian speakers are increasingly likely to learn Estonian, 
Latvian and Lithuanian (Zabrodskaja 2009; Ernstsone & Mežs 2008, 195) they are no less 
likely to want to display their cultural ‘Russianness’. This leads Pisarenko (2006, 767) to the 
conclusion that it is more appropriate to talk about ‘competitive integration and bilingualism 
than assimilation’.   
Significantly, the current body of research on Latvia and Estonia challenges linear 
assimilation models which predict that increased integration in one area (for example, 
linguistic proficiency of the majority language) will lead to increased integration overall, and 
eventually to full assimilation into the core society. Nimmerfeldt, Schulze and Taru’s (2011) 
study of second generation Russians in Estonia points to the misplaced, linear assumptions 
that have underpinned government integration policy in both countries. The authors employ 
four conceptual dimensions of integration which are often used in the literature: structural, 
cultural, social, and identificational (Heckmann & Schnapper 2003, 10),4 and analyse survey 
data accordingly.  
At the heart of the Estonian and Latvian governments’ early programmes was the conviction 
that the success of their integration strategies rested upon improving structural integration 
(i.e. increased access to the countries’ political and social institutions) by raising Russian 
speakers’ linguistic knowledge of the official state languages. However, as Nimmerfeldt et al. 
note, the riots in the centre of Tallinn in 2007 (see below) were carried out by youth who, in 
many instances, were highly proficient in Estonian. This has led policy makers in both 
countries to reassess their integration policies. By studying this phenomenon along these 
four axes, it is possible to see that, contrary to the expectations of policy-makers, Russian 
speakers with higher levels of structural integration do not generally display significant 
increases in social or identificational integration. The only positive and statistically significant 
relationship was between structural integration and cultural integration (measured by 
Estonian language knowledge).  
This raises the question of why integration does not follow the linear model that has been 
identified in other geographical areas. Kruusvall, Vetik, and Berry (2009, 15) cite negative 
attitudes of the majority group, rather than demographics or socio-economic factors, as the 
central impediments for successful integration. Indeed, Kulliki Korts (2010, 117) observes 
that there is a big difference in the way that integration is perceived from an Estonian, 
compared with a Russian-speaking, perspective. Consequently, it is a weakness of the 
current literature that relatively little focus is placed upon the positions of majority Latvian 
and Estonian groups vis-à-vis Russian speakers.  
Brigita Zepa et al (2006, 26), in one of the most comprehensive studies of integration 
practice in Latvia, and one of the few to focus on majority opinions, found that among 
Latvians there was actually broad support for non-Latvians who pursued either assimilation 
or integration strategies. In their survey of over 600 Latvian respondents, integration 
strategies were rated marginally more favourably than those of marginalization.  
This seemingly contradicts the hypothesis that Estonian and Latvian attitudes impede the 
integration process. However, in addition to prevalent societal attitudes of the majority 
group it is important to consider the institutional realities that underpin the integration 
programmes. A number of authors, for example, highlight the discrepancy between the 
stated aims of Estonian and Latvian integration policies and their actual institutionalization 
(Pettai 2003; Agarin 2009; Malloy 2009). As Timofey Agarin argues, the institutions 
connected with the integration programmes have been ‘designed to attend to the interests 
of the dominant ethnic group’ (Agarin 2009, 199). In Agarin’s analysis of Latvia’s integration 
programme from 2001 to 2008, he notes that Latvians had a privileged role in the 
implementation of its activities, while little room was given to minorities to articulate 
demands. Tove Malloy is not as critical of the Estonian programme. She notes, however, that 
while multiculturalism has often been alluded to in official documents, it is a particularly 
Estonian-centric form of multiculturalism that privileges the core Estonian language and 
culture (2009, 235). 
Socio-economics and Russophone identity 
Another factor that is often cited for the failure of integration policy centres is socio-
economics. While Laitin’s economically driven rational choice model of assimilation has been 
largely rejected, a number of commentators still see the prime importance of socio-
economic factors in separating the titular groups from Russian speakers. Magdalena Solska 
(2011), for example, views Estonia’s ‘Bronze Soldier’ riots through the prism of socio-
economics more than identities. In 2007 predominantly Russian-speaking youth took to the 
streets of Tallinn in violent protest against the government’s decision to relocate a 
controversial Soviet Second World War memorial.5 While it was noted that many 
participants waved Russian flags and shouted pro-Russian, anti-Estonian slogans, Solska 
argues that the protesters were motivated because they ‘felt that Estonians had better 
opportunities for jobs and education as well as for participation in political and community 
life because of their belonging to the core nation’ (2011, 1101).  
Economic studies of average wage earnings suggest that, even controlling for geographical 
segregations, levels of education, and language skills, non-Latvians and non-Estonians face 
an ‘ethnic wage gap’ (Leping & Toomet 2008). For Estonia the mean wage was found to be 
as much as 10-15% higher for Estonian workers than non-Estonians. In Latvia Mihaels 
Hazans’ analysis of economic data from 2002 showed a 10% wage gap between Latvians and 
other ethnic groups (2005, 39).6 This leads some authors to label Latvia and Estonia ‘regimes 
of discrimination’ (Hughes 2005a; Woolfson 2009).7 For James Hughes (2005a, 744) these 
regimes rely on three main policy pillars: denial of citizenship, cultural subordination, and 
restriction of political and economic participation. Citizenship and cultural subordination 
certainly merit intense scrutiny. However, as Charles Woolfson (2009, 960) suggests, 
economic data in the Baltic states should be treated cautiously as they do not account for 
the significant size of the informal economy. Accordingly, Aasland and Fløtten have 
suggested that ‘ethnicity is not a decisive factor in explaining income inequalities in present-
day Estonia and Latvia’ (2001, 1047).  
Even if this assessment is more accurate than that of Hughes, it is still important to consider 
the regime of discrimination argument. Objective economic realities are not always as 
important as prevailing economic perceptions. Therefore it is not sufficient solely to consider 
the impact of economic discrimination. Instead we should also be aware that political and 
cultural practices may lead to increased perceptions of economic discrimination. In the 
1990s language legislation was introduced in the Baltic states demanding proficiency in the 
state languages (Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian) in order to find employment in certain 
professions (Dobson & Jones 1998 41-42). Arguably, however, this has had minimal effect on 
economic inequality. A majority of professions which require the highest levels of linguistic 
proficiency are in the poorly-paid public sector. The language laws therefore have greatest 
effect in excluding monolingual Russian speakers from poorly-paid public sector jobs 
(Toomet 2011, 529). Nevertheless, the fact that these restrictions exist (irrespective of real 
economic consequences) can understandably lead to perceptions that the state is inherently 
biased towards ‘its’ majority group.  
For this reason Geoffrey Evans (1998) cites state policies and perceptions of discrimination as 
the two main factors leading to ethnic polarization in Estonia from 1993-1995. Evans 
employs the conceptual framework of exit, voice and loyalty as adapted from Hirshman’s 
economic theory of consumer behaviour.8 Because Evans found evidence that perceptions 
of discrimination were high, and that Estonian society was ethnically polarized, he logically 
foresaw the ‘eventual emergence of a mobilized ethnic political voice within Estonia’ (57).  
Having the advantage of hindsight it appears this prediction was somewhat overstated. 
Instead all three Baltic states have been largely remarkable for their general lack of ethnic 
mobilization among Russian speakers. This might be expected in Lithuania where the 
proportion of Russian speakers is comparatively much lower. But it is also true for Latvia,9 
and even more so for Estonia. In Estonia, ethnic Russian political parties have fared poorly in 
elections and, with the notable exception of the ‘Bronze Nights’ in 2007, violent mobilization 
has rarely occurred in any form. In this light it is worth revisiting socio-economic arguments 
from a different perspective.  
From a purely Baltic perspective, economic discrimination, and perceptions of economic 
discrimination, may well have aided the consolidation of a form of Russian-speaking identity. 
However, if we take a more international perspective, and examine socio-economic factors 
in relation to Russia, then we can see why Russophones in the Baltic states have been so 
politically passive (adopting strategies of symbolic exit as well as loyalty rather than voice). 
When it was clear that violent patterns of ethnic conflict were not developing in the Baltic 
states, a number of commentators started to search for explanatory variables to explain this 
lack of violence. Ain Haas, writing in 1996, considered a number of important explanations 
including political culture, history, and relative power balance between the two main ethnic 
groups. Significantly one of the variables singled out by Haas was the relatively high pace of 
economic reform in Estonia compared to Russia. Baltic Russians, he noted, ‘feel that they 
would have little to gain from Russia’ (1996, 70) where the economic situation was more 
chaotic and had fewer job prospects.   
For Magdalena Solska (2011), these economic factors help to explain why Estonia’s internal 
ethnic tensions are less strained than Latvia’s. Solska presents an optimistic (I would strongly 
suggest overly optimistic) account of Estonia’s success in creating a unified political 
community, where ‘ethnicity is not politicised any more’ (1106). Nevertheless, while Solska’s 
optimism should be questioned, she presents a good case to suggest that Estonia has been 
more successful than either Lithuania or Latvia in this regard. At the heart of this success 
Solska cites the economic performance of the Estonian government which has led to 
increased trust in political institutions and therefore increased value in Estonian citizenship 
compared with either Lithuania or Latvia (1104). This corresponds with the argument put 
forward by Külliki Korts (2009, 130) and Vihalemm and Kalmus (2009, 110) that Estonian 
Russians have become more similar to Estonians in their general thought patterns, and 
somewhat differentiated from their parents as a result of Estonia’s consumerist, and 
globalized culture.  
Additionally, there is evidence that Russian-language media and political discourses in the 
Baltic states have been slowly shifting away from an exclusive focus on discrimination, to a 
more optimistic assessment of the economic position of Russian speakers. In Latvia, where 
Russian maintains a more pervasive influence than in the other two Baltic states, an 
increasingly popular observation is that tri-lingual (Russian, Latvian, and English) Russian 
speakers often have an inherent advantage in the labour market over their bi-lingual (Latvian 
and English) Latvian counterparts (Cheskin 2010, 342; Cheskin 2013, 307). Discourses of 
ethnic discrimination, while not disappearing, are therefore being interspersed with more 
optimistic accounts.      
Overall we can conclude that the socio-economic picture for Russophones in the Baltic states 
is complex. While, on the one hand, perceptions of economic discrimination have arguably 
aided the formation of a consolidated form of identity, recent developments suggest that 
socio-economic factors may also have a positive impact on integration. However, these more 
positive trends have not been sufficient for experts to rate Latvia and Estonia’s integration 
programmes as successful. A wide-ranging study in 2010, while noting some positive trends, 
concluded that Latvian society remained ‘not very integrated’ (Muižnieks 2010, 284). In 
Estonia, criticisms that the 2000-2007 integration programme neglected socio-economic 
concerns (Enrst and Young Baltic 2009, 7) led to a more comprehensive focus on non-
linguistic aspects of integration for the 2008-2013 programme. While there are some 
positive signs from the preliminary monitoring report of the 2008-2013 programme 
(Estonian Ministry of Culture), the report nonetheless categorizes 50% of the county’s non-
Estonians as poorly or not integrated, while only 21% are considered integrated. 
It therefore appears that structural integration (increased access to economic and political 
opportunities) has not led directly to greater social and identificational integration. 
Consequently we can see that language skills, access to citizenship, and socio-economic well-
being are not the only factors that determine the levels of social and identificational 
integration.  Another area of ever more importance to researchers and policy-makers is the 
phenomenon of collective memories.  
History, memory and state narratives 
For Vita Zelče (2009, 54) one of the most significant factors in the failure of Latvian 
integration policy remains ‘collective memory and the inability to achieve a convergence of 
historical perceptions’ between different ethnic groups. In the Baltic states a great deal of 
research into collective memories has been conducted, often focusing on societal divisions 
between Russian speakers and their Latvian/Estonian/Lithuanian counterparts, or on the 
tensions between the Baltic states and Russia (Onken 2007; Onken 2010; Cheskin 2012; Berg 
& Ehin 2009; Hackmann & Lehti 2008).  
This interest was largely sparked by the 2007 ‘Bronze soldier’ riots in Estonia’s capital. As 
discussed above, for many this signified the failure of state integration policy, and the 
limitations of a linguistically-driven approach. Tellingly, in the Latvian government’s 
Guidelines for National Identity, Civil society and Integration Politics, approved in 2011, one 
of the central foci of social integration is now ‘the creation of collective social memory’ 
(Latvian Ministry of Culture 2011, 6).  
The literature commonly accepts that there is a significant difference in how Russian 
speakers view the region’s 20th century history when compared to the titular groups 
(Gruzina 2011; Wertsch 2008; Zelče 2009; Vihalemm & Jacobson 2011). Following Russia’s 
criticisms of Estonia’s memory politics, this divide has led to what Mälksoo refers to as a 
‘memory war’ (2009). The differences of historical interpretations and collective memories 
centre on competing narratives of Soviet history. Russian speakers are more likely to deny 
that the Soviet Union occupied the Baltic states, and are more likely to associate the Soviet 
Union with positive achievements such as the creation of industry, job security, and welfare 
provision (Wertsch 2008; Zelče 2009; Cheskin, 2013). 
For many scholars this memory divide is a natural result of the state and nation-building 
policies pursued by all three Baltic states in the late Soviet and early independence periods. 
In the Baltic states grand narratives of the past were invoked which were clearly linked to 
the emergent independent states (Smith et al. 1998, 99-109; Eglitis 2002). While Lithuania 
was not as explicit in tying its citizenship to these historical narratives, it was nonetheless 
clear that Lithuanian language and culture were to be the bases for Lithuanian state and 
nationhood.  
The prominence of memory in recent scholarship shows that Russia can have a potentially 
significant influence on Russian-speaking identity in the Baltic states. Russophones are 
exposed to the cultural and political memory narratives of the Russian state through 
extensive consumption of Russia’s media (Lerhis 2007: 54), and many continue to feel close 
cultural connections to the identities signified by Russia’s officially propagated collective 
memories (Cheskin 2013, 296).  
In terms of integration, the issue of memory also demonstrates that certain forms of identity 
stand apart from linguistic, socio-economic, and structural factors. If we are to understand 
the integration and identity dynamics of Russian speakers in more detail, it is therefore 
necessary to develop a model that can take account of all of these aspects including socio-
economics, language, politics, and more cultural understandings such as those encapsulated 
by memory.  
Framework for analysis: Brubaker’s ‘nationalism reframed’ reframed  
From the analysis above it is clear that the interests of researchers have diverged greatly, 
embracing numerous academic approaches. To what extent then is it possible to employ a 
single theoretical and analytical framework to bring together this broad range of insights and 
perspectives? The predominant framework employed in the literature is Rogers Brubaker’s 
triadic nexus (figure 1). Brubaker posited that, in order to understand minority nationalism 
National 
Minority 
Nationalizing 
State 
External 
Homeland 
in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe, three categories of analysis were of central 
importance: ‘national minorities, the newly nationalizing states in which they live, and the 
external “homelands” to which they belong’ (1996, 4).  
Much of the research on Russian speakers in the Baltic states has utilized this framework, 
with a number of authors adding a fourth node, that of international institutions (Smith 
2002; Kelley 2004; Galbreath 2005). As Smith (2002, 3) notes, this quadratic approach is 
more appropriate for the Baltic states as it links ‘an ascendant and expansive ‘Euro-Atlantic 
space’’ to the existing framework. In the Baltic context, this approach has been employed 
successfully in determining the interplay between international organizations (the EU, OSCE, 
Council of Europe), external homelands (Russia), nationalizing states (Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania), and national minorities (Russian speakers).  
 
Figure 1: Brubaker’s triadic nexus 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It has been observed, however, that Brubaker’s nexus works better as a conceptual model 
than as a causal construct (Pettai 2006, 133). One reason is Brubaker’s insistence that the 
nexus be seen in relative, rather than objective, terms. This proceeds from the author’s 
theoretically complex understandings of nationalism, which he notes are not analytically 
irreducible (Brubaker 1996, 67). 
In order to avoid essentializing the nexus Brubaker depicts the nodes in terms of relative 
‘fields’ which themselves are not static. Additionally, and this has largely been ignored in the 
subsequent literature, Brubaker notes the importance of stances and representations within 
the triadic interplay (68-69; see also Pettai 2006, 133). Stances can be understood as 
discursive practices as well as more concrete policies that emerge from a certain (relative, 
contested, and non-static) field. Representations, on the other hand, are the selective ways 
that an external field is perceived. Although Brubaker goes into very little detail, it is 
surprising that this aspect of the nexus has not been explored more fully.   
For Brubaker’s nexus to be effectively utilized it is important to combine the study of policies 
and events with discursive, perceptual elements. By merging these considerations into our 
understanding of stances and perceptions the nexus becomes more useful in understanding 
the conflicting processes surrounding the formation and consolidation of Russian-speaking 
identity. Indeed, it is my argument that this framework can help to explain why a solidified 
form of Russian-speaking identity has emerged in some respects, while it is also weakly 
formulated in others.  
Significantly, the data presented above give reason to believe that a high number of Russian 
speakers continue to represent and perceive the Baltic states as nationalizing and 
discriminatory. This is not to say that the Baltic states are discriminatory. Rather, as Brubaker 
himself notes, it is more a question of whether states are perceived to be nationalizing than 
whether they are ‘really’ nationalizing (Brubaker 1996, 63).  
On the other hand, the evidence also suggests that Baltic Russian speakers increasingly 
perceive themselves as different from Russians in Russia. In previous research Russian 
speakers have pointed to their perceived ‘Europeaness’ as a factor that separates them from 
Russians in Russia (Cheskin, 2013: 294-295). The globalized, trans-European environs of the 
EU therefore also influence the position of Russian speakers in the Baltic states (Vihalem & 
Masso, 2003: 24). It is therefore essential to understand the complex interplay between the 
four nodes of the quadratic nexus.  
Russian speakers are subject to a number of contradictory forces. At one level Russian-
speaking identity can be solidified through self-marginalizing strategies (Golubeva et al. 
2007) which discursively portray ‘their’ group to be discriminated against by the 
(‘nationalizing’) Baltic states. At the same time their identity as Baltic Russians, and therefore 
distinct from Russians in Russia, pushes them back towards identification with the Baltic 
states. This, in turn, weakens the internal solidity of a group identity which has been based 
on the notion that they are, in fact, different from Estonians/Latvians/Lithuanians. 
Additionally, European structures and discourses also potentially influence identity patterns 
by providing economic and symbolic inducements away from the homeland nationalism of 
the Russian Federation.  
To complicate matters more, certain stances from the nationalizing state and the external 
homeland are perceived positively, while others negatively. To make sense of this 
conceptually, and drawing on the analysis above, a useful approach is to divide each field 
into the three sub-fields of politics, economics, and culture (see figure 2). This division is not 
designed to be static. Instead each sub-field refers to the representations that Russian 
speakers may have of certain aspects of the nationalizing state, their external homeland, and 
international organizations. Although there are a number of possible international 
organizations that can influence Russian-speaking identity, for the sake of parsimony, and 
recognizing the preeminent role of the EU, the following section focuses exclusively on the 
European Union (understood as a symbolic, political, and territorial entity) when referring to 
the fourth node of ‘international organizations’. It is important to note that, as with 
Brubaker’s original fields, the sub-fields are highly contested, negotiable, and subject to 
change.  
The four categories help to conceptualize the extent by which individuals relate to, identify 
with, or feel estranged from each node. Politically this is manifested in, among other things, 
support for (or opposition to) the independence of their country of residence, levels of trust 
and participation in political channels of representation, degrees of support for European 
integration, and territorial identification with Estonia/Latvia/Lithuania. Similarly the sub-field 
of economics describes the socio-economic push/pull factors that orient individuals 
positively or negatively towards each node. The cultural sub-field refers to how cultural 
stances and representations, such as memory orientation, linguistic practices, and ethnic 
traditions affect individuals’ identification with the ‘nationalizing state’, ‘external homeland’, 
or ‘international organizations’. 
Using this expanded frame of reference we can see some of the contradictory identity 
pressures that Russian speakers encounter. Table 1 postulates how each sub-field acts either 
as a positive or negative pole of attraction. It is acknowledged from the outset that this 
tabulation is not without its ontological and epistemological problems. For one thing there is 
the danger of essentializing group identity for Russian speakers by suggesting that they will 
all be similarly affected by each of these nodes. Nevertheless, by concentrating on what 
Brubaker has elsewhere termed a process-focused approach (2004, 11), we are able to move 
beyond simplistic approaches which reify collective identities – ‘groupism’ in Brubaker’s 
parlance (1998). A process-focused approach reflects an attempt to understand not what a 
nation or group is, but rather how particular categories of race, nation or ethnicity work 
(Brubaker 2009, 29).  
 
 
 
Figure 2: The reframed (quadratic) nexus 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: External homeland, nationalizing states, and international  as positive and negative 
poles of attraction for Russian speakers 
 
External homeland 
(Russia) 
Nationalizing state 
(Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania) 
International 
Organization (EU) 
Political Economic Cultural Political Economic Cultural Political Economic Cultural 
–/+ – + –/+ + – + + + 
 
The table therefore does not indicate the ‘real’ relationship between the separate fields of 
the nexus. Instead it considers how the relationships might be perceived by a number of 
Russian speakers. Other Russian speakers may experience different perceptions, which in 
turn may create further contestation within the relative fields. Nevertheless the positive and 
negative indicators in the table are inferred from the analysis presented above. There is 
therefore some justification in employing these generalized indicators in order to come to a 
better understanding of the processes which potentially affect Russian-speaking identity in 
the Baltic states. 
As highlighted above, the relative strength of the Baltic states’ economic position logically 
weakens identification with the Russian Federation. Additionally there is little evidence that 
the majority of Russian speakers in the Baltic states have strong political identification with 
Russia (although specific individuals and groups will differ). The field of cultural perceptions 
and stances, however, holds much more appeal for Russian speakers (see Vilhalem & Masso, 
2003: 103). Whether it is Russian historical narratives, consumption of Russian media and 
entertainment, or affinity with the Russian language, these cultural aspects within the 
homeland nationalism field appear far more attractive than the sub-fields of economics and 
politics. In this sense the reframed nexus is conceptually useful as it allows Russia to act as a 
cultural homeland for people who are not ethnically Russian. A ‘Russian-speaker’, who is 
ethnically Belarusian, for example, may feel significant attraction to Russia on linguistic and 
cultural grounds even when Russia is not considered as an ethnic homeland per se.  
The value of the reframed nexus is therefore that it allows us to examine the influence of the 
Russian Federation even for people who do not explicitly consider it to be an ‘external 
homeland’. Admittedly, the term external homeland is itself problematic, especially for 
many Russian speakers who have had no experience of life in Russia, or who are not even 
ethnic Russians. Nevertheless, the validity of this concept is maintained by the continued 
insistence by Russian authorities that they have a duty to protect the rights of ‘Russian 
speakers’ (for example President of Russia 2014).  
With respect to the Baltic states, there is still good reason to believe that Russian speakers 
continue to perceive many of the nation and state building stances of these countries rather 
negatively. Estonian and Latvian integration programmes, for example, are often viewed as 
one-way processes of assimilation into the ‘core culture’ of the ‘titular nation’. David Smith 
has termed this process ‘dissimilation’ whereby the titular culture of the Baltic states is 
deliberately separated and demarcated from the cultural practices of the non-titulars (2005, 
188). This, of course, potentially erodes political identification.  
Conversely, increasing numbers of Russian speakers now have Latvian and Estonian 
citizenship and therefore feel potentially less alienated from the political process. Because 
Lithuania adopted the ‘zero’ option of citizenship it is common to treat the country as 
fundamentally different from Latvia and Estonia. While in the cultural sphere Lithuanian 
language laws show a great deal of overlap with those of Latvia and Estonia, politically, 
because of its liberal citizenship laws, Lithuania is more attractive to Russian speakers than 
the other two Baltic states. This is reflected in survey data that show consistently higher 
levels of attachment by Russian speakers to Lithuania compared to Latvia or Estonia, as well 
as lower levels of identification with Russia (Muižnieks, Rozenvalds & Birka 2013, 302-306).   
The impact of the European Union is perhaps more difficult to assess as there is a relative 
scarcity of research that has explored stances and perceptions of Russian speakers in 
relation to the EU along the political, economic, and cultural axes. Nevertheless, the fact that 
many Russian speakers point to their Europeanization as a factor that differentiates them 
from Russians (see above), indicates a certain level of positive cultural attraction towards the 
EU. Because the Baltic states are EU members, this helps to orient Baltic Russian speakers 
towards their ‘nationalizing state’. Additionally, even when Russian speakers feel politically 
alienated from the Baltic states, Russia’s attractiveness is reduced by perceived economic 
opportunities in other EU countries (Aptekar 2009). Because Estonian, Latvian, and 
Lithuanian citizenship is concurrently EU citizenship, we may speculate that politically the EU 
is an attractive force that adds value to Baltic citizenship. However, more research is needed 
in this area.  
As well as helping to understand some of the trends in group identity formation, the 
tabulation in table 1 helps to obtain a more comprehensive understanding of integration 
strategies. Earlier it was noted that Russian speakers in Latvia and Estonia have displayed 
increasing levels of structural and cultural integration (measured by access to political and 
social channels and knowledge of the state language respectively). At the same time, levels 
of social and identificational integration have remained relatively low. Cultural integration is 
rather narrowly defined in this respect and does not correspond to the much broader sub-
field of culture which has been employed within the nexus. With these trends in mind, focus 
on the nexus’ sub-fields allows us to see direct links between the complex interplays 
between nationalizing states, national minorities, national homelands, and international 
organizations.  
It is fair to suggest that the sub-fields of politics and economics, although sometimes 
contradictory, generally exert a positive pull on Russian speakers towards the Baltic states. 
There are real (and perceived) political and economic incentives for Russian speakers to 
acquire Baltic citizenship and to learn the state languages. We may posit that Russia 
generally does not offer the same level of political or economic attractiveness. As a result we 
can witness relatively high structural and cultural integration.  
However, it is important not to overlook entirely the potential for Russia’s political 
attractiveness. In 2013, for example, there were a reported 93,795 Russian citizens in 
Estonia and 43,586 in Latvia (Muižnieks, Rozenvalds & Birka 2013, 292). Using crude 
calculations this amounts to approximately 29.6% and 6.7% of the Russian-speaking 
populations of the two countries respectively.10 While the validity of such figures has been 
questioned (Pettai & Hallik 2002, 527) they nevertheless indicate, especially for Estonia, that 
Russian citizenship retains some appeal for at last a proportion of the population. 
The relatively higher percentage of Estonia’s Russian speakers with Russian citizenship has 
been traced back to the uncertainty surrounding the country’s ‘law on aliens’, whereby non-
citizens were required to register for temporary residency permits (Semjonov 2002: 121-4; 
Muižnieks, Rozenvalds & Birka 2013: 292). This highlights the importance of domestic 
stances in determining political orientations. In Lithuania the political attraction of the 
‘nationalizing state’ is markedly more apparent thanks to the country’s less restrictive 
citizenship laws. This is reflected in levels of identification with Russia and Lithuania among 
resident Russian speakers (see above).  
On the other hand, notwithstanding successes in terms of structural and cultural integration, 
identificational integration remains relatively low (especially for Latvia and Estonia). This can 
be attributed to the greater level of attractiveness that the external homeland represents in 
this area. Additionally, the cultural stances of the Baltic states continue to be perceived 
rather negatively. Many Russian speakers therefore still view Baltic cultures in terms of 
‘their’ and not ‘our’ culture (Cheskin 2013, 304-305). This is especially true for Latvia and 
Estonia, where the titular cultures and languages have not been projected as inclusive, but 
instead in highly ethnicized terms. This can be seen in the restrictive citizenship laws and the 
particularly one-sided premises of the countries’ respective integration programmes. For the 
case of Lithuania the cultural attraction of the Lithuanian state for Russian speakers appears 
to be more positive than for their counterparts in either Latvia or Estonia. To some extent, 
however, identification with the abstract concept of Europe can mitigate the cultural push 
factor of the nationalizing state by offering Russian speakers a layer of identification that 
further demarcates them from Russians in Russia.  
Overall then this differentiated approach to Brubaker’s triadic nexus is very fruitful. Rather 
than seeing ‘nationalizing states’ as monolithic entities that either attract or repel ‘national 
minorities’, this expanded model shows the contradictory influences of each of the nodes on 
the nexus. It also allows us to hypothesize conditions that would facilitate full assimilation, 
integration, marginalization, and separation (table 2).  
For full assimilation to occur Russia would need to have very little attraction while the Baltic 
states would require significant attraction either directly, or indirectly, via the appeal of the 
EU and ‘Europeaness’. For integration The Baltic states would need to exert similarly high 
levels of attraction but Russia would need to exert some form of cultural appeal. 
Marginalization would occur when none of the three nodes exerted any meaning attraction. 
Full separation, for its part, would be likely where the external homeland was significantly 
more attractive than the nationalizing state of residence. In all of these instances, stances 
and representations of and towards the EU can be expected to correlate with levels of 
attraction with the Baltic states. Because, unlike Russia, the Baltic states are EU member 
states, we can expect positive association with the EU to correlate with positive association 
with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.  
 
Table 2: Hypothetical conditions for full assimilation, integration, marginalization, and 
separation of Russian speakers 
2.1: Full assimilation External homeland (Russia) Nationalizing state (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) International Organization (EU) 
Political Economic Cultural Political Economic Cultural Political Economic Cultural 
– – – + + + + + + 
 
2.2: Full integration External homeland (Russia) Nationalizing state (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) International Organization (EU) 
Political Economic Cultural Political Economic Cultural Political Economic Cultural 
– – + + + + + + + 
 
2.3: Full marginalization External homeland (Russia) Nationalizing state (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) International Organization (EU) 
Political Economic Cultural Political Economic Cultural Political Economic Cultural 
– – – – – – – – – 
 
2.4: Full separation External homeland (Russia) Nationalizing state (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) International Organization (EU) 
Political Economic Cultural Political Economic Cultural Political Economic Cultural 
+ + + – – – – – – 
 
Naturally, however, the actual situation facing Russian speakers (generalized in table 1) is 
more ambiguous and contradictory than in these hypothetical scenarios. Table 1 attempts to 
reflect the complex realities of the formation of Russian-speaking identity in the Baltic 
states, as well as the unclear patterns of integration that currently occur. In reality, neither 
Russia nor the Baltic states are sufficiently attractive or repellent to create conditions 
conducive to any one of these four integration strategies (although the situation will differ 
from individual to individual). It also means that there are certain incentives to form a 
consolidated group identity, while simultaneously opposing pressures against such a 
development. 
Conclusions  
Perhaps one of the most fundamental, and yet complex, questions this paper has addressed 
relates to the group status of Russian speakers. Do Russian speakers actually constitute a 
national minority? Obviously this question needs to be addressed at a discursive level where 
it is understood that all nation groups are ultimately imagined. Nevertheless, the survey of 
the current literature, combined with the insights from Brubaker’s nexus, allow us to see the 
contradictory processes that both facilitate and impede the formation of a ‘Russian-speaking 
nationality’ in the Baltic states. We may conclude that a relatively stable form of Russian-
speaking identity has emerged but that it remains fairly fragmented. For a more 
consolidated identity to develop two main changes are necessary. Firstly Russian speakers 
would have to perceive their ‘nationalizing states’ of residence more negatively. Secondly, 
they would have to perceive their ‘external homeland’, the Russian Federation, more 
positively.  
As the current situation stands, the interplay between the stances of the Baltic states and 
the perceptions of Russian speakers is such that there is generally more positive attraction 
than negative towards Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Socio-economics plays a large part in 
this as the perceived economic advantages of being resident in the Baltic states 
disincentivize certain forms of identification with Russia. This is most keenly felt in Estonia, 
the most economically successful of the Baltic states. Conversely, cultural identification with 
Russia remains relatively strong because Russia maintains positive influence through media 
and the Russian language, and because the stances of the Baltic states continue to be 
viewed as culturally discriminatory. Politically Estonia’s and Latvia’s restrictive citizenship 
laws act as repellent forces against the Baltic states. Nevertheless, this is somewhat 
mitigated by the rise in Russian speakers who now hold Baltic citizenship, as well as the fact 
that Russia holds relatively little political attraction of its own. Because of Lithuania’s more 
liberal citizenship policies Lithuania has considerably more political attraction than either 
Latvia or Estonia. Socio-economic factors, therefore, reduce the capacity for a consolidated 
identity; political factors slightly reduce this capacity; while cultural factors increase the 
potential for a consolidated group identity.   
It should be noted, however, that further research needs to be conducted in order to build 
up a more comprehensive picture of how the political, economic, and cultural sub-fields 
affect different geographical and socio-economic groups of Russian speakers. While the 
general data suggest that the Baltic states are more economically attractive than Russia, this 
may be less apparent within disadvantaged socio-economic groups of Russian speakers. For 
example, vulnerable socio-economic groups are likely to possess lower levels of proficiency 
in the languages of the Baltic states. In Estonia and Latvia, where knowledge of the state 
language is a requisite for the acquisition of citizenship, we may posit that such groups will 
also be more politically estranged than their better-educated counterparts. As Olga Cara’s 
research (2010: 22) has highlighted, although Russian speakers in Latvia generally favour 
strategies of integration over assimilation, separation, or marginalization, there is still 
significant support for separation. Cara also notes that ‘preference of separation strategy 
was statistically significantly interrelated with lower level of the Latvian language knowledge’ 
(24).  
Brubaker’s nexus has previously been criticized for deemphasizing class as an analytical 
category (Bogden 2011). The application of the reframed nexus model to different socio-
economic groups would therefore be useful in generating meaningful data that could help to 
shed further light on the persistence of strategies of separation, and also relative 
fragmentation among Russian speakers. Certainly, existing data already point to a 
correlation between low levels of education and disadvantaged economic status on the one 
hand, and high levels of political disaffection on the other (Agarin 2013: 340).     
Additionally, there is a need for this model to be applied more rigorously to the forth node 
of the nexus – international organizations. While studies have examined the impact of 
Europeanization and EU-ization on out-migration trends of Russian speakers (Ivievs 2013), 
more research needs to be conducted examining the cultural, economic, and political effects 
of such trends on Russian speakers in relation to identification with both their ‘nationalizing 
state’ of residence and their ‘external homeland’. 
While the analysis above is based on data from the existing literature, future research that 
employs this framework will be able to examine the stances and representations within the 
nexus in more detail. For example, the stances of the ‘nationalizing state’ can first be 
mapped out by examining policy choices and political discourses that relate to the subfields 
of economics, politics and culture. These can be quantitative economic data and specific 
policies as well as discursive representations that come from state structures and their 
associated representatives.  
Next, qualitative data from Russian speakers can be used to assess their perceptions of these 
policies and the affect they have on their identity positions. In other words, fitting with the 
process-focused approach, the emphasis is not on what policies are, but how they operate 
and are perceived. At the same time, public portrayals of Russian speaking identity can be 
categorised as stances in their own right. Again, these can be discursive articulations by 
political groups and prominent individuals, or they can be concrete actions such as protests 
or campaigns. These can then be used in a triangulated approach to see how and if the 
stances of the nationalizing state respond to the publicly articulated positions of Russian 
speakers. Data for this can be drawn from interviews with cultural and political elites, and 
also from discourse analysis of public articulations.  
Alongside analysis of the relationship between the ‘national minority’ and ‘nationalizing 
state’, similar analysis of the other relationships in the nexus will facilitate a greater 
understanding of the complex interplay between all of the nodes on the nexus. Russian 
policies and initiatives towards their ‘compatriots abroad’, for example, can be analysed in a 
similar manner to the domestic policies of the ‘nationalizing state’.    
A final point to emphasize is that the nexus is far from static. Russia’s assertive policies and 
actions in Crimea in 2014, for example, demonstrate that there is continuous scope for 
Russia to alter its relationship with Russian speakers. In recent years Russia has been placing 
increasing emphasis on ‘soft power’, linking the cultural and ethnic links with its ‘diaspora’ to 
explicit foreign policy goals (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 2013). If 
Russia is able to build upon its already significant cultural attractiveness in this manner, then 
Russia will also have much potential to increase its political attractiveness, at least for 
certain groups of Russophones in the Baltic states. In Latvia this can already be seen in the 
public support given to Russia’s incorporation of the Crimean Peninsula by the increasingly 
vocal political party ‘Russian Union of Latvia’ (2014).   
Additionally, the stances of the ‘nationalizing states’ continue to shape identities and 
integration patterns within the three countries. For the reasons discussed above, in the 
1990s Russian speakers generally refrained from opposing restrictive citizenship and 
language policies through open mobilization. However, with an increasingly assertive and 
seemingly confident Russia, the implications of further nationalizing policies may be very 
different today. Not only has Russia been able to maintain cultural appeal, it now has more 
economic and political potential. For the case of Crimea, Russia was able to refer to historical 
and cultural ties with the peninsular, but also pointed to the political illegitimacy of the Kyiv 
(‘fascist’) authorities and promised Crimean residents higher pensions and economic 
prosperity (Kyiv Post 2014). The reframed nexus allows us to bear these international and 
domestic contexts in mind. As such, Baltic policy-makers will do well to consider carefully the 
representations that their policy and discursive stances will produce among Russian 
speakers. When making these domestic policy assessments the economic, political, and 
cultural appeal of Russia should never be ignored.  
  
 
                                                     
1 In this article Russian speakers (without a hyphen) is used to describe individuals whose first language is 
Russian. Russian-speakers (with a hyphen) is used to refer to a group, understood as an imagined community. 
For grammatical clarity the hyphen is maintained when using the term in adjectival form, e.g. ‘Russian-speaking 
identity’.  
2 For an overview of Soviet nationalities policies see Kaiser 1997 
3 Within the federal system of the Soviet Union titular ethnicity (titul’naya natsional’nost’) refered to the ethnic 
groups which gave their name to union republics, autonomous republics, autonomous oblasts, and 
autonomous okrugs; their so-called ‘root nation’ (Korennaya natsiya). In the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic – 
‘Latvians’ were the titular nation; in the Chechen–Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic – ‘Chechens’ 
and ‘Ingushians’ etc.  
4 Nimmerfeldt et al. define structural integration as ‘the acquisition of rights and equal access to the major 
institutions of society’. Cultural integration is defined as ‘the process of cognitive, behavioural and attitudinal 
change that occurs when individuals from different cultures come into contact.’ Social integration they define 
as ‘the degree to which members of different groups are segregated and the degree to which they interact’. 
Finally, they define identity integration as focusing on ‘ethnic and national self-identifications.’ (2011: 78-79) 
5 For detailed accounts see Brüggemann & Kasekamp (2008) and Smith (2008). 
6 The wage gap in Estonia was 16% and 9% in Lithuania 
7 For a debate on this issue see Hughes (2005b) and Muižnieks (2005). 
8 Exit can be defined as secession from the dominant regime by a group, or outward migration for individuals, 
or symbolic exit whereby individuals and groups reside in a given territory but take relatively little interest in 
political, economic, or social life. Loyalty is generally manifested in assimilation or integration into the host 
society. Voice represents ethnic mobilization through non-violent engagement with institutions and politics, or 
through recourse to more militant channels. See Evans 1998, 59.  
9 This is despite the fact that there have been a number of visible exceptions including the education reform 
protests in 2003/4 and attempts to give Russian the status of a second state language. While significant, these 
events have passed relatively quickly and have not mobilized Russian speakers to more permanent forms of 
protest or contention.   
10 These calculations are based on numbers of Russians, Belarusians, and Ukrainians in each country from 2011 
census data: Source: Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia and Statistics Estonia.  
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